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COMMON LAW PLEADING IN MISSOURI-THE
ACTION OF GENERAL ASSUMPSIT FOR
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.
"The action for money had and received has always been one
favored in the law, and the tendency is to widen its scope-it being a
flexible form of action, levying tribute on equitable as well as strictly
legal doctrines; so that it has become axiomatic that the action lies
where the defendant has received or obtained possession of the money
of the plaintiff, which, in equity and good conscience, he ought to pay
over to the plaintiff."
Judge Lamm, in Clifford Banking Company v. Donovan Com-
mission Company, 195 Mo. 1. c. 288.
In Common Law Pleading the action of "General Assumpsit lies
where the plaintiff, instead of declaring on an express province, de-
dares generally, as for a debt or pecuniary demand, founded upon
an executed consideration. The basis of the action is the promise
implied by law from the execution of the consideration, or from a
legal duty resting upon the defendant. A promise is implied either
where the law presumes it, as a matter of fact, from acts voluntarily
done or suffered by the defendant which warrant the inference that
an agreement actually existed; or where the law raises a fictitious
promise, as a legal presumption, from a legal obligation resting upon
the defendant."
Shipman's Common Law Pleading, page 12.
In General Assumpsit, the action for money had and received is
one of the money counts of the common courts. It has been recog-
nized and used from time immemorial and, as we shall presently see,
is still used practically in its ancient form in the Code States--par-
ticularly in Missouri.
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We often hear the law student say: "Why should I study Com-
mon Law Pleading when I expect to practice in a Code State? That
is an old and obsolete system and will in r,,wise benefit me in the
actual practice of the law in the State where I expect to engage in
my life's work."
So. too, might the student of the science of government say:
"Why should I study the governments of the ancients-the Greeks,
the Romans, the Hebrews, the Egyptians and all those other antiqui-
ties? I want to be up-to-date and put in my time studying the gov-
ernments of today and not waste it on those which passed into history
centuries ago."
The science of pleading, however, like the science of govern-
ment, is the product of growth, of evolution, and he who would know
his pleading well must needs study it from the beginning, for he will
find, when he gets into actual practice, that he is constantly meeting
his old friend, "Common Law Pleading," who, despite the numerous
attempts to abolish him by legislation, still survives and flourishes.
Moreover, the Legislature of Missouri has wisely prescribed
that Common Law Pleading shall be a subject in which every appli-
cant for a license to practice law in this State shall be proficient be-
fore he shall receive the coveted certificate.1
That the rules, and even the forms of Common Law Pleading
still flourish in Missouri is no more clearly demonstrated than in the
steps taken by the 1Pench and Bar of this State with reference to
that court, in the Action of General Assumpsit, known as the Court
for Money Had and Received.
That this form of action has been so widely adopted by the bar of
this State is certainly not without justification, for as Judge Lamn
said (supra): "It lies when the defendant has received or obtained
possession of plaintiff's money which in equity and good conscience
he ought to pay over."
It is a flexible form and the modern tendency is to widen its
scope. Under it the plaintiff needs only to show that defendant
received his money, and that so far as plaintiff is concerned, he
(plaintiff) received no value for it. That being shown, the burden is
cast upon defendants to show that he is innocent in the transaction and
has given value for plaintiff's money to some one who apparently
had the right thereto. Hence the form of the action is so flexible
that the defendant has the advantage of being able, under the gen-
1 1 R. S. Mo.. 1909, Sec. 944.
2 Clifford Banking Co. v. Donovan Commission Co., supra, i. c. 285.
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eral denial, to introduce evidence tending to show that in equity and
good conscience, he is entitled to retain the money.'
It will be seen from the above quoted citation from Shipman
that the action of General Assumpsit, which includes Money Had and
Received, will not lie unless it is founded on an executed considera-
tion. That is, the right of action must be complete in that the money
held by the defendant is the money of plaintiff and is not subject to
any claims or conditions, and that the duty of defendant to turn the
money over to plaintiff is complete and unqualified. It has, there-
fore, been held that although the beneficiary of a trust, constructive'
or express, may sure the trustee in an action for Money Had and
Received, but the action "will not lie when the trust is still open."s
The availability and flexibility of the action is illustrated by the
widely different states of fact on which the action has been success-
fully based.
Thus, in Drumm Floto Commission Company v. Bank," it was held
that, where a bank received the proceeds of mortgaged personalty sold
by a third party, it would be liable to the mortgagee for money had
and received if, after notice of his claim and before he had a reasonable
opportunity to assert his right, the bank paid the money over to the one
for whom the money was collected.
So, too, where the receiver, assignee or trustee in Bankruptcy
for a bankrupt corporation finds that an officer of such corporation,
although authorized to sign its checks, has used checks drawn upon
the corporate funds to pay his private debts, he may recover from
the payee in an action for Money Had and Received.'
And when it is shown that the checks were received by the de-
fendant in payment of the officer's private debt, the burden is on the
defendant to show the officer's authority to draw upon the corporate
funds for his private purposes.'
In 1917, however,"0 the Missouri Legislature prescribed that there
should be no recovery under such circumstances unless the plaintiff
could show that, when collecting the proceeds of the check, defendant
had actual knowledge that it was issued without authority from the
corporation.
2 Richardson, Admin. v. Moffett West Drug Co., 92 Mo. App. at p. 521.
' Clifford, etc., v. Donovan, etc., supra, 1. c. 290.
5 Zeideman v. Molasky, 118 Mo. App. 106.
* Zeideman v. Molasky, 1. c. 119.
1192 Mo. App. and 107 Mo. App. 426.
s McCullam v. Buckingham Hotel Co., 198 Mo. App. 107.
U Idem, I. c. 116. See also St. Louis Charcoal Co. v. Lewis. 154 Mo. App
548; Coleman v. Stocke, 159 Mo. App. 43.10 Laws of 1917, p. 143.
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In the Buckingham case (supra), it was held that the Act of 1917
did not apply, however, to checks issued prior to its passage.
It has also been held that the action will lie against one who, as
payee thereof, has received the proceeds of a bank draft drawn by
its cashier on the bank's correspondent in payment of the cashier's
obligation to the defendant, although the cashier had authority to
sign drafts."1
In such a case the payee (defendant) accepts the drafts at his
peril. He must show the actual authority of the cashier to draw that
particular draft."'
In the case of Blake, Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc. v. Third National
Bank," it was held that where the defendant had received from one
partner funds of his (the partner's) firm to discharge such partner's
individual obligation, without the knowledge or consent of the other
member of the firm, the defendant who received such partnership
funds could be liable to the firm's trustee in bankruptcy for Money Had
and Received.
In the Clifford Banking Company case, uspra, it was held that the
action would lie against a commission company to recover the proceeds
of certain bank drafts, bearing the valid signature of the cashier of
the bank, which had been forged by a clerk in the bank, by the inseu-
tion therein of defendant's name as payee thereof, the proceeds being
credited to the clerk's individual account with the commission company.
In Walton v. Chalmers (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 1918),"
plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy for a corporation, was allowed to
receive, as for money had and received, money of the corporation which
its president had paid to a bank to take up the president's individual
notes which the defendant had pledged with the bank as collateral
security for the payment of his (defendant's) note to the bank. Judge
EJlison said, 1. c. 91: "The important thing is that the funds of the
paint corporation were used by Hughes, its president, to pay his individ-
ual debt. If this was done with defendant's knowledge, he can be made
to return it to the corporation-he runs 'the risk of being called upon
to restore it.' "
In Reynolds, Receiver, v. Whittemore (St. Louis App. 1916),15
the defendant, who, through the indorsement of a corporations' secre-
tary on a cashier check payable to the corporation, had procured the
11 Kitchens v. Teasdale Commission Co. 105 Mo. App. 463.Is St. Charles Savings Bank v. Edwards, 243 Mo. 533; See also, Ide v.
Orthwein, etc. 160 Mo. App. 369.13 219 Mo. 644.
14205 S. W. 90.
1 190 S. W. 594.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol4/iss1/1
COMMON LAW PLEADING IN MISSOURI
funds of the corporation in payment of the secretary's personal obliga-
tion, was held liable to the corporations' receiver in an action for Money
Had and Received.
In Whitecotton v. Wilson (St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1917),10
it was held that a Trust Company, defendant, was liable to plaintiff
in an action for money had and received where its depositor had
deposited with it money which the latter had procured by means
of a deed of trust on real estate the title to which had been
procured by the depositor who, acting as agent for plaintiff, had
traded plaintiff's land for such real estate, plaintiff having notified
the Trust Company that the money so deposited rightfully belonged
to him. The notice was merely verbal, but, plaintiff having been
prompt in the institution of the suit, Judge Reynolds said, 1. c. 171:
"After that notice the Trust Company must be adjudged to have
held the money then on hand and of his deposit to the use of
plaintiff. If, after that notice, the Trust Company paid out any part
of it to Wilson, it did so at its peril."
It was held that the action could be maintained against a county
for plaintiff's money deposited by her with a third party as security
for another who, with plaintiff, had signed, as surety, a recognizance
on which a forfeiture had been declared but on which no judgment
had been entered because, before judgment, the prisoner had been
produced, such holder of the money having paid it into the county
treasury."1
In Skinner v. Henderson," it was held that the action will lie to
recover back money paid on an unexecuted illegal contract.
So also, may there be recovery from the stockholder of a bet
before the bet has been determined.1 '
An attorney receiving notes for collection will be liable in an
action against him by his client for money had and received where,
in satisfaction of such notes, he has received from the debtor notes
of other persons.20
In Tamm v. Kellogg1 it was held that the action would lie to
recover money paid by the City of St. Louis to the defendant for land
condemned for street purposes, the ownership of such land being, at
the time of payment, in dispute between defendant and plaintiff, the
latter having been found to be the rightful owner.
19 197 S. W. 168.
17 Meekins v. Sullivan County. 154 Mo. 136.
18 10 Mo. 205, and 13 Mo. 99.
19 Humphreys v. Magee, 13 Mo. 435.
20 Heux v. Russell, 10 Mo. 246.
2149 Mo. 118.
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In Third National Bank v. Allen," it was held that the drawee
(a bank) could recover from the payee of a forged check, not known
by either to be forged, money paid by the former to the latter on
the ground that "as money paid under a mistake of fact may always
be recovered back, one who pays money on forged paper, by dis-
counting it or cashing it, can always recover it back, provided he
has not materially contributed to the mistake himself, and has given
sufficiently early notice of the mistake to the other party after he has
discovered it." (I. c. 313.)
The case of Maguire v.The State Savings Association, Respondent,
and the County Court of St. Louis County, appellant," is quite inter-
esting. Maguire was the County Collector. As such he held for col-
lection certain tax bills against the respondent. He had the power
to enforce collection and demanded interest on the bills. Respond-
ent, under protest, paid the tax bills and $10,372.54 as interest thereon.
It then sued Maguire, in an action for money had and received,
to recover the interest thus paid. Pending the action, the County
Court made claim to the money. Maguire filed his petition, in
the nature of a Bill of Interpleader, to require the County Court to
interplead. This was done and, on trial, respondent recovered. The
court held that the tax bills did not bear interest and that the money
thus illegally exacted could be recovered as for money had and
received.
In the case of Cool Co. v. Estate of Slevin,"I it was held that the
Probate Court had jurisdiction of such an action asserted as a claim
against an estate in process of administration even if the Probate Court
did have no jurisdiction in equity cases, and the action did involve the
enforcement of a constructive trust.
In Chase, etc. v. Willman, etc.,2 where an attorney held for collec-
tion against a debtor claims of plaintiff and of defendant and, collecting
plaintiff's claim, by mistake, paid the money over to defendant, the
latter would be liable to the former for money had and received.
In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. MeLiney," defendant was
the shipper of a car load of flour. He procured negotiable bills
of lading and attached them to drafts which he discounted with
a bank. Plaintiff delivered the flour to the consignee without taking
up the drafts and bills of lading. The consignee paid for the flour
259 Mo. 310.
2 62 Mo. 344.
", 56 Mo. App. 107.
23 63 Mo. App. 482.
2 32 Mo. App. 166.
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to the shipper (defendant). Plaintiff, being liable to the bank, paid it
and took from it an assignment of the drafts and bills of lading.
It was held that plaintiff, the Railway Company, could recover
from the defendant, the shipper, for money had and received.
In Richardson, administrator, v. Moffett West Drug Co.,*' it
was held that one who has collected the proceeds of an insurance policy
on the life of the deceased is liable, as for money had and received,
for the proceeds thereof so collected unless defendant shows his right
thereto.
Judge Goode said, 1. c. 521: "The simplicity of the action is
what commends it to the favor of the courts. A plaintiff is exonerated
from the necessity of stating the special circumstances of his case
and, therefore, from the danger of a nonsuit by a variance between
his allegations and the proof; while as to the defendant: 'It is the
most favorable way in which he can be sued; he can be liable no fur-
there than the money he has received, and against that may go every
equitable defence upon the general issue; he may claim every equit-
able allowance; he may prove a release without pleading it; in short,
he may defend himself by everything which shows that the plaintiff
ex aequo et bono is not entitled to the whole of his demand.' Mose
v. Macferlan, 2 Burr, 1005. Such was the econium pronounced
by Lord Mansfield more than a century ago."
In this action, however, the facts must be shown that in equity
and good conscience the plaintiff is entitled to the money for which
he sues.
The case of Henderson, Probate Judge v. Koenig, Probate Clerk,
and the City of St. Louis,"' illustrates this rule.
Prior to 1899 the City of St. Louis Probate Judge, elected by
the people, was entitled to collect and keep the fees of the office and
employ and pay the clerk and his deputies. In that year, by an act
of the Legislature, the office of Judge was put on a salary basis and
the office of Clerk was made elective, with a fixed salary, both salaries
to be paid by the city, which was to receive and enjoy the fees. In
the election of 1897, Henderson was elected Judge, and Koenig Clerk.
The former, when inducted into office, refused to recognize the act
of 1897 as being constitutional and sued to prevent Koenig from col-
lecting and paying the fees into the city's treasury and to prevent the
city from receiving the moneys, on the ground that the Act of 1897
was unconstitutional. On appeal from the Circuit Court from a final
judgment, in favor of the defendants, on a demurrer to the petition,
2l 92 Mo. App. 515.
28 192 Mo. 690.
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the Supreme Court" held the act to be unconstitutional and the
petition to be good. When the case came back to the lower court
the plaintiff amended his petition so as to make it an action for
money had and received and claimed therein that he was entitled to
all the fees collected by Koenig and that, although Koenig, with his
deputies, had performed all of the duties of Probate Clerk and had
been paid by the city for such services and although plaintiff had
availed hinself of such services and, by numerous acts, had recog-
nized Koenig as such Clerk, yet, because under the old law he, as
judge, was entitled to receive all the fees and to employ and pay the
Clerk and his deputies, he . ould now recover all such fees so received
by the city.
In ruling against him and holding that, while the Judge was en-
titled, in this action, to recover such part of the fees as had been
received by the city over and above what it had paid to the Clerk
and his deputies, he could not recover that part represented by the
city's judgments to Koenig and his deputies.
In so ruling, Judge Gantt in his opinion, said: "Recognizing, as
he did, the legality of the services rendered by these clerks and depu-
ties, and holding them out to the public as rightful officers, though
holding under an unconstitutional act, he cannot appropriate their
services and repudiate the authority of the city to pay them. He
must be held to have waived -the unconstitutionality of the act and
ordinance as a whole so far as the Clerks were concerned. This con-
clusion seems so palpably just and equitable that we have no disposi-
tion to interpose barren technical rules, which are salutary in proper
cases, to work out a contrary and unjust conclusion.
"Keeping constantly in view that the very foundation of plaintiff's
claim to these fees is that he is entitled to them ex aequo et bono, we
are prepared to say that in equity and good conscience he must be
required to do equity and allow the salaries which the city paid out
for the performance of the services."
Other Missouri cases illustrative of the scope of this form of
action are:
Thurley v. O'Connell, 48 Mo. 27.
Evans v. Hayes, 1 Mo. 697.
Quinnett v. Washington, 10 Mo. 53.
Benoist v. Siter, 9 Mo. 649.
Insurance Co. v. Ford, 10 Mo. 295.
Magaffin v. Muldrow, 12 Mo. 512.
"168 Mo. 356.
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Robbins v. Alton M. F. Ins. Co., 12 Mo. 380.
Kanada v. North, 14 Mo. 615.
Columbus Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 18 Mo. 229.
Koontz v. Central Natl. Bank, 51 Mo. 271.
American Brewing Co. v. St Louis, 187 Mo. 367.
Harrison v. Lakeman, 189 Mo. 581.
Davis v Krum, 12 Mo. App. 279.
Jacoby v. Hearn, 32 Mo. App. 566.
Koopman v Cahorn, 47 Mo. App. 357.
Winningham v. Fancher, 52 Mo. App. 458.
Fisher v. During, 53 Mo. App. 549.
Harris v. Dougherty, 68 Mo. App. 105.
Deal v. Bank, 74 Mo. App. 262.
Kelley v. Osborn, 86 Mo. App. 239.
York v. Farmers' Bank, 105 Mo. App. 127.
Fallis v. Gray, 115 Mo. App. 253.
Cornet v. Boyle, 116 Mo. App. 430.
Crigler v. Duncan, 121 Mo. App. 381.
Stout v. Hardware Co., 131 Mo. App. 520.
Roberts v. Neale, 134 Mo. App. 612.
Stuyvaert v. Arnold, 122 Mo. App. 421.
Montgomery v. Wise, 138 Mo. App. 176.
Jenkins v. Clopton, 141 Mo. App. 74.
Central Mfg. Co. v Montgomery, 144 Mo. App. 494.
Bank of Laddonia v. Bright, etc., 139 Mo. App. 110.
Parker v. Harrison, 146 Mo. App. 329.
Wilson v. Duffy, 158 Mo. App. 509.
The authorities herein cited clearly show to the active practi-
tioner the value and availability of this form of action which can be
used in a wide scope of cases. It is an action at law, which is assign-
able and which is of such latitude that it may embrace causes of action
and remedies which might, at first flush, be considered to be cogniza-
ble in equitable proceedings only.
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